Genuine Implementation of R-ARCSS is the Best Hope for South Sudan

By Manyang Rwei Gach, Juba, South Sudan

Introduction

Monday, June 15, 2020 (PW) — The Republic of South Sudan is the newest country in the world. The country was born as a result of many decades of painful liberation struggles against the successive and oppressive regimes in the Sudan. The Referendum of January 2011 resulted in 98.83 per cent voting for separation ended the North Sudan’s hegemony and marginalization of South Sudan. Shortly after secession from the North, the people of South Sudan were having high hopes and expectations that the SPLM would immediately deliver basic services and expedite equal development and security once in control of the country’s natural resources and sovereignty. Alas, such hopes and expectations vanished immediately with the independence. 

In 2013, civil war started as a political dispute between President Salva Kiir, head of the ruling SPLM/A, and his former VP Riek Machar (PhD), now leader of SPLM/A-IOand the First VP of RTGoNU. Several sources and political analysts contested the causes and genesis of the current conflict. Although root causes of the conflict maybe a topic of another day, however, it’s imperative to shed light on a few. Jeremy Astill-Brown and Johnson argue, that the original causes of conflict are “more likely to be found in the personal rivalries in a multi-ethnic group of self-serving individuals within the elite”, and the impact of the civil wars as the main cause of conflict (‘South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict’ and ‘Briefing: The Crisis in South Sudan’). Luka Biong (PhD), former Minister in the Office of the President of South Sudan and former Director of now the Institute of Peace, Development and Security Studies (IPDSS), University of Juba provides six main components causing civil war: first, the unstable management of transition from civil war to peace in 2005, liberation to government and a united Sudan to an independent country; second, the SPLM leadership shock with the death of John Garang in 2005; third, the ‘curse’ of oil and liberation, as South Sudan was 98 per cent dependent on oil in 2013; fourth, the consequences of the poor implementation of the CPA with grievances buried and not adequately addressed; fifth, the weak institution of the SPLM; finally, the trap of being, as referred to by Paul Collier, the ‘bottom billion'(‘South Sudan: the path for peace’, 1 Feb 2016). Again, Fenella in her research, the key factors causing civil war are “the curse of liberation, the politics of natural resource revenue and land-locked resources with bad neighbours and a prolonged period of bad governance.”

As I concur with the scholars’ views above, however, some root causes of the conflict include struggle over power and resources, corruption, long ethno-historical conflicts or chauvinism, tribal army or militias – linked to politics, fragile institutions, endemic-war mentality, and proliferation of arms in the hands of an authorized civilians who unleash them to kill or loot. 

Indeed, the internal armed conflict caused myriad factors among which tens of thousand South Sudanese still languish as IDPs in protection of civilians (PoC) sites of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and million others fled to neighboring countries as refugees. The conflict also has fueled and furthered the existing vicious cycle of inter-tribal or communal violent; weak institutions, unconstitutionality, chronic tribalism, ubiquitous corruption, underdevelopment, economic meltdown, socio-political disintegrations, egregious human rights violations; rampant killings by so-called “unknown gunmen”, to mention a few. 

That said, the warring Parties signed the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 12, 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Therefore, the author explores and unearths some potential successes, opportunities, failures or challengesof the R-ARCSS.

How the R-ARCSS designed: the RTGONU to succeed or fail

Regional or international community can intervene in a country wracked by internal conflict through different intervention modalities. However each intervention approach is relevant to a particular situation. Therefore, some of the intervention modalities often used by regional or international community to address non-international conflict are briefly highlighted below:

One-country-two systems: first, a full or quasi-autonomous regional government maybe adopted within a country until a final solution is made either through a popular consultation or referendum. It also means separation of warring parties by creating new sovereign states especially if the war has been fought among territorially distinct ethnic, linguistic or national groups (Kaufmann 1997). This internal conflict prevention modality, for instance, was used in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement or Army (SPLM/A) in 2005 and also in Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 in which quasi-autonomous governments were given to then Southern Sudan. The CPA modality was a bit unique because of two armies existed within the country besides Joint Integrated Units (JIU), self-determination through referenda in Southern Sudan Abyei, and popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, unlike the Addis Ababa accord. But this modality is often prone to easy abrogation by the powerful party.

From war-to-democratic transition: the warring parties will be supported or forced to reach a compromise peace agreement so as to transition from war-to-peaceful democratic system of government. So, it’s the international or regional negotiators that will encourage warring parties to negotiate a settlement and undergo a war-to-democratic transition within an existing State in which conflicts on the battlefield or the streets are ended through the sequence introduction of democracy: elections, parliamentary politics by political parties, independent judicial institutions, and resuscitation of civil society all underpinned by a basic floor of human rights usually enshrined in newly negotiated constitutions (Erikson and Wallensteen 2004). This conflict prevention or intervention modality is what IGAD applied in the R-ARCSS.Thus each approach is applicable or applied in a different context considered necessary by the negotiators.

Power sharing – former rebels and others in a unity government: power sharing is a conflict management approach. Any mediator or negotiator will use this approach in which the warring parties are included in a unity national govt. The former guerilla or rebel movements will be guaranteed their incentives and positions in the future government. Several scholars have given their views on power sharing as conflict management modality some subsequently discussed. First, “power sharing enhances democratic governance for many divided societies; contributes to peace and democracy; a tool for short-tem peace; a means for inspiring democracy suggesting that government by many is more legitimate than mere majority rule” (Lijphart 1997). Second, “power sharing is at times can be construed as an alternative to competitive elections, and more power sharing, the higher the likelihood that the peace will endure” (Spears 2000:108 and Hartsell et al. 2003:319). Hence, the two power sharing approaches are somewhat South Sudan is envisaged to undertake or grappling with. 

However, the R-ARCSS has been designed to include former rebels and other political parties to a responsibility or power sharing deal in the RTGoNU, which will take effect at all levels of the govt. throughout the country for a period of three years. The Agreement also contemplates peace and stability; transformation of former rebel movements to transition from war-to-democratic system of govt.; undertakes major institutional reforms across the country; and conductselections at the end of the transitional period (TP). However exclusion of holdout groups may trigger or cause more unnecessary violent, use hit-and-run attacks with an aim to disrupt the Agreement, and perhaps have a leverage and consideration in future negotiations. Besides, the power-sharing approaches have their ups and downs wherein some in the R-ARCSS are emphasized as follows:

Power sharing ends one-party politics: power sharing that allows full-free-fair citizenry participation, democratization, and also provides security and political leveling space for all parties will enhance sustainable peace. A conflict resolution process that establishes a democratic political system thus encompasses necessary procedure for transforming the struggle into constitutional and non-violent forms (Wallenteen 2002:139) is essential. Cerdas Cruz argues that, “the incorporation of insurrectional groups into the system, transformed into duly legalized political parties, is critical for the future of the transition and the formation of a truly representative party system” (1998:15). This is what the R-ARCSS hinges on. However, like in South Africa, the “sunset clauses” – “majoritarian democracy” provided for smooth end to formal power sharing and the permanent constitution was adopted in 1996 without power sharing guarantees. Though “sunset clauses” are not stipulated in the R-ARCSS, yetinference maybe made to when a genuine “majoritarian democracy” will prevail in South Sudan after free, fair and credible elections conducted at the end of the TP.  

Why power-sharing government fails?

Insecurity and deep-rooted mistrust: in many conflict-shattered communities, power sharing might be inadequate to mitigate immediately the parties’ vulnerability during peace process. The IMPACT (Implementation of Pacts) data set, in the conflicts where an agreement of political power sharing was reached and implemented within five years, nearly half of all cases saw the recurrence of warfare within this period (Jarstad and Sundbarts 2007). So, in the case of South Sudan, widespread insecurity and deep-rooted mistrust among the Parties are some factors likely to hamper the implementationof the Agreement. 

Fear of being labeled as traitor: power sharing entails great concessions among many contending belligerent parties. Leaders may fear if they accept power-sharing deal, their followers would see them as traitors (Sisks and Stafes 2005), or the followers hesitate when see no prospects for peace pact. The case in point is South Africa where the then National Party withdrew from the power sharing agreement in 1996. Hence, the same is loosely said for National Salvation Front (NAS) of Gen Thomas Cirillo who refused to sign the R-ARCSS in 2018 with the view, that the Agreement did not address the root causes of 2013 conflict.

Risks of violence – resumption: lingering violence or war mentality may disable or wither power sharing from taking roots. Again, conflict-profiteers would often agitate for violence to flare up whenever they see no gains in the power-sharing agreement. In Sierra Leone 1999, it was violence tendencies that caused their power-sharing to break up. Thus power sharing at times cools conflict-red ambers or flames either temporarily or permanently. Succinctly put, the way things are unfolding in South Sudan give an impression, thatrisk of violence – resumption radar is seemingly high. But Deciëu (God) forbid!

Conundrum of inter-groups relations: inter-groups relations in war-shattered societies may be affected by power sharing that is a horizontal dilemma of who to include and who should not. Basically power sharing should endeavor to include all warring parties and consociations. Therefore, a holistic peace agreement must prioritise inclusivity of belligerent parties,holdout groups, consociations, as well as consider full participation of the grassroots.

End violence-not-build democracy: conversely, power sharing sometime is to end violence and not build democracy. To lay down arms, parties demand guaranteed positions in the future government (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005). Hence, for power sharing to be effective, must consider several aspects including spirit of nationalism, reconciliation and forgiveness, inclusivity of all warring parties and consociations. Neglect of other warring parties and consociations in power sharing govt.poses dilemma to the peace success. So, all holdout groups in South Sudan should have to board R-ARCSS’ peace-wagon in order to end violence and continue building democratic system of govt. in the country.

In short, power sharing has serious negative effect on democratization, peace building, and indeed can be a source of instability, [in]effective governance and violent conflict (Rothchild 2005b). The justification is that some representatives of the former warring parties in a unity govt.do not sometimes give up easily their war-mentality despite peace deal. The people of South Sudan indeed have witnessed pervasive war-obsession in 2013, 2016, and even now. 

Despotism and unfair political competition: a power-sharing govt. in which one party controls economic resources, media, and other platforms to mobilize political support with a view to relegate others to merely “shadow-political parties” is totally uncalled-for. The political uneven space often employs by a despotic party can have negative long-term effect on the prospects for multi-party democracy in a country. Thus, the political parties, the consociations, and the grassroots should exercise freely their constitutional political rights for peace,stability, rule of law, and good democratic governance to prevail in the country. 

Transform and transition former rebel movements to democratic political parties

In some cases, it maybe explicitly stated in a peace accord, that the former rebels should be allowed to form a political party and participate in the post-conflict elections as a legitimate political party or parties. In fact, the R-ARCSS is silent on that, however, it’s incumbent upon SPLM/A-IO and others to legalize formation in order to transition into legitimate political parties. The SPLM/A-IO was to merge with the SPLM-IG as provided under Arusha pact, but the merger, in my view, is like passing of a “camel in an eye of a needle” – paraphrased.

Having said that, former rebels emerged as new government party after decades of armed struggle, for examples, in South Africa, East Timor, and the Palestinian self-governing territories. In other cases, former rebels emerged as opposition parties in the post-conflict settlement period, for example, in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique among others. However, attempts to transform former rebels might also fail in which the then rebels return to arms again during the implementation of the peace agreement as in the case of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and that is unfortunate event I am also seeing to happen in South Sudan.

Furthermore, some rebel movements may emerge as political parties through establishment of power sharing mechanisms. In Angola, UNITA completed its transformation into political party after the death of its leader Jonas Savimbi and decided to take up its sets in both the parliament and cabinet per 1994 agreement. So, this may, or may not happen in South Sudan.

Role of political parties in new democratic system

Among many other roles, the political parties act as agents of democratization. Transformation of former rebels to transition into peaceful political actors or parties fulfills an aim of conflict resolution and can equally be an emergence of a multi-party system in an earlier autocratic, semi or quasi-democratic state. Traditionally, political parties have been regarded as the main intermediary organisation of liberal democracy, linking citizens with state. In most contemporary democracies, political parties are considered “a sine qua non for the organisation of modern democratic polity as well as for the expression and manifestation of political pluralism” (van Biezen 2003:1). Thus, the political parties as agents of democratization will only thrive in a country where there is political resolve to create enabling political space to freely exercise political rights without fear of intimidation or death. This exercise is very much needed in South Sudan for justice, liberty and prosperity to prevail.

Problems facing political parties in new democracies

There are numerous shortcomings that face mushrooming political parties in emerging democracies which include among others lack of institutionalization; enjoyment of little or vertical legitimacy from the grassroots, weak roots or small-based support in community; poor organizational underpinnings or geographical spread; a few opportunities for structured interaction between parties; as well as lack of both financial and human resources. 

However, the political parties “remain an indispensable institutional framework for representation and governance in a democracy”, and “only political parties can fashion diverse identities, interests, preferences, and passions into laws, appropriations, policies, and coalitions” (Diamond 1999b: 96-98). Diamond further said, “some degree of party system institutionalization of parties with effective, autonomous organisation and developed relatively stable linkages to voting blocs and social organisations – seems an important condition for democratic consolidation” (1999). It’s a chance for SouthSudanese political parties to seize without letting it slip from their political fingers. Smaller political parties, to succeed in elections, must form political alliances to remove authoritarian regime in a country. This happened in Kenya during 2002 elections where National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) unseated Kenya African National Union (KANU) that had been in power for decades. However, further limitations of transformation and transition of former rebel movements to formidable political parties in new democracies can also be viewed as follows

1. Horizontal dilemma of armed insurgents in post-conflict politics: exclusion of armed insurgents in a unity government will threaten peace, or even their inclusion without proper transformation to transition from-war-to politics is also challenging. The risk of sedimentation of parties and issues are often based on structures of war. Democratization requires radical shift in nature of political power (Ottaway 1997). Suffice it to say, sufficient attention be taken to include all in the peace process to enhance lasting peace and stability in a country. 

2. Elections in emerging democracies: elections in weak or non-democratic states are likely to function as a vehicle for political upheaval. They may even contribute to the sedimentation of existing power structure through “premature closure” of transitional process due to the establishment of formal procedures and institutions before a real change in the nature of power has taken place (Ottaway 1997:3). This happened in Bosnia, where the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Bosnia Party of Democratic Action (SDA) played an important role in hampering democratic development (Reilly 2002). Thus, in South Sudan, the same scenario is likely to happen, or no elections at all. Indeed, the Parties are focusing on future elections and how to win them, a tendency although good, however, it is premature, and probably would nip the Agreement in the bud. 

3. Willful violation of agreement: disagreement by the Parties on selection of States and local govt. or unilateral appointment of some portfolios by one Party is indicative of bad faith. The Parties are intransigent and trading blame-game at best. In a nutshell, the Parties should put the national interests first and implement the Agreement “in letter and spirit”, period.

Popular or vertical legitimacy of agreement

Local ownership of any peace deal and democratic process is essential. Any peace imposed from outside rarely holds. A few examples are: in Kosovo 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovania 1995 in which structures were only accountable to international administrators, thus risking increasing support for extremism and ethno-chauvinism and this undermined peace, stability and democracy. Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism – views functioning democracy in societies divided along ethnic lines and coined concept of ‘consociational democracy’ in 1968 to denote an institutionalized form of democratic conflict management for divided societies. “Majority rule is not only undemocratic, but also dangerous and risks resulting in civil strife” (Lijphart 1999:31-33). In countries such as Lebanon in 1985 Lijphart writes: “the choice is not between consociational and majoritarian democracy, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all” (1985:13). She advocated for group-based form of democracy so as to avoid majoritarian dictatorship. Therefore, local ownership of peace deal – inclusive of all South Sudanese people in the unity govt. will enhance vertical legitimacy of the Agreement and bolster political democratic system.

Why unification of forces is important in South Sudan?

Factors such as lack of political will, deep-rooted mistrust, corruption, justice and accountability, fear of unknown, as well as the army – SPLA or SSPDF “too deformed to be easily reformed” are posing threat to implementation of the R-ARCSS. However, all the Parties, the grassroots and the guarantors ought to adhere to the terms and provisions of the Agreement. Prioritization of forces-unification: organization, integration and training of about eighty-three thousand(83,000) national army and other organized forces – severed from politics – is critical. Undeniably, the Parties are insensibly tossing the Agreement left and right. They have nothing to lose, thus can extend the Agreement as often as they desire. This mutilation of the R-ARCSS by the Parties, and the sitting by of the citizens in South Sudan is disturbing.

Indeed, transforming former warring movements into peaceful formidable political parties, as well as the former rebels or militia groups into truly national army is an uphill task. The unification of forces into one national army is a sine qua non without it “civil wars cannot be brought to an end, an important normative goals such as the creation and consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights have little chances of success” (Stedman, Rothchild, and Couvens 2002:668). A risk of renewed conflict increases, if no proper demilitarization, demobilization and integration of forces is done. In fact, a “comprehensive national disarmament” strategy effected instantly throughout South Sudan is urgently needed. Thus, the transformation and transitional of former rebels to political parties affect both the capacity and the willingness of these groups to remain committed to the peace process (Lyons 2002 and 2004). 

Therefore, unification of all forces – delinked from politics – will instill sense of hope, trust and a commitment to the peace deal. And so, if the former rebel movements feel to have a stake in the post-conflict political order and believe they have a credible chance of organizational survival and political influence through peaceful means, they are likely to remain committed to implementing the agreement and have fewer chances to return to war. 

Hybridization of peace and justice in South Sudan

Peace working in tandem with justice should be a way to go in South Sudan. The practice placing peace and conflict resolution before justice and human rights may be considered as trade-off with the principle of rule of law that symbolizes a democratic political system (Baker 2001). Indeed, the approach poses an obstacle to the prospects of future democratization in post-conflict societies. An approachinstead places justice before peace and emphasises the need for prosecution for abuses committed during the conflict can serve several functions that further a democratic culture (Kritz 2001:808-809). It can also provide victims with sense of justice, put an end to culture of impunity, and provide an important focus for rebuilding justice or the criminal justice system in accordance with rule of law principles. Peace settlements that build on democratic foundations “have a far better chance achieving sustainable security”, while settlements that put conflict management before democracy and human rights may have ended brutal civil wars but remain internally fragile (Baker 2001:760-761). Although peace and justice maybe seen as theoretically separate goals; they are necessarily mutually exclusive in practice (Mimi Söderberg Kovaw: 143). Nevertheless, I tend to believe that, the hybridization of peace and justice is also a kingpin of the R-ARCSS. This is why attempts are made to reconcile the two approaches through institutions for truth, healing and reconciliation, and justice. Any approach furthering peace, justice and democracy will depend or differ substantially from case to case, and also dependent on answers to questions of who should be held responsible, for what, and by who? However, bringing perpetrators to justice is not alone the best strategy, but to build durable culture that is working concurrently with peace and justice is essential. 

Again, the price of granting individuals or groups of people amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights abuses committed during violent conflict would be painful and unfortunate one. Alas, it is impertinent to stress,that amnesty is nowhere in the R-ARCSS. Nevertheless, the selected approach of hybridization of peace and justice must have blessings of local population. The outcome of Hybrid Court for South Sudan, hopefully to be established soon, depends to a large extent on the perceived legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of domestic population. Arzt noted that – “if international criminal courts are to achieve their aims – one of which is to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the triumph of the rule of law […] – the perception of their legitimacy by the local population is a crucial factor” (2006: 227). Therefore, peace must exist, as well as the perpetrators of heinous crimes committed during South Sudan conflict equally face wrath of law without any exception.

Role of guarantors in agreement

A guarantor or third-party plays a pivotal role in any peace deal. Notably, many power-sharing arrangements are mediated or negotiated and guaranteed by international actors. The guarantor may have shortcomings, however, the dependence of the belligerent parties on the guarantor activates the systemic dilemma evidenced by the case of Cyprus in 1960where a third-party took side thereafter. However, whether the same scenario is, or likely to happen in South Sudan remains to be seen. 

The combination of third-party security guarantees and power sharing pacts are critical to the peaceful resolution of civil wars (Walter 2002). Therefore, the guarantors are necessary to support, ensure smooth functioning power sharing govt. and prevent a return to war, but they should not undermine local ownership of the peace process, rather engage in nurturing the Agreement and withering institutions.

Peace-building in post-conflict South Sudan

Peace building is a process that, must start from within individuals, homes, communities until encompass the whole country. Formation of inclusive and legitimate govt. will usher in stability in the aftermath of a civil war, and that is through collective peace building crusade. 

In South Sudan, all the Parties and especially the two principals, Kiir and Riek, should be seen and heard always in peace-caravan preaching nothing but peace, unity, healing, reconciliation and justice across the country. Through peace building and political will – the leaders must transform the “deformed tribal army”, SSPDF or whatever into truly one national army. The peace-building exercises will slowly enhance sense of confident and trust in and among conflict-shattered communities. Therefore, building socio-political bridges across the board will gradually extinguish conflict-red-flames, subsequently the country will begin to rise-up from “dirty ashes of conflict” to stability and prosperity again. 

Conclusion

The main object of the R-ARCSS is to achieve durable peace, security, political stability; national unity, healing and reconciliation; equitable delivery of basic services; mega institutional reform; justice and accountability; and most importantly conduct free, fair and credible elections at the end of the transitional period, in which a democratically elected govt. be established in the Republic of South Sudan.

Indeed, no peace agreement is perfect, but its perfection is through implementation. Efficient and effective institutional reform, notably security sector reform in rem of “too deformed army” – SPLA now SSPDF as well as mushrooming militias, properly transformed and transitioned into a truly unified-one-national army – completely delinked from politics – is a cornerstone of the Agreement. 

Undoubtedly, the Agreement is tragically at crossroads. The Parties are insensitively at odds with and intransigent to establish urgently a complete RTGoNU and RTNL, as well as transform Judiciary. Inability of the Parties to address and contain Covid-19 pandemic, rampant insecurity, economic meltdown, widespread corruption, deep-rooted mistrust, lack of political resolve, have serious setback on the peace process. Yes, some Parties and conflict-profiteers or their cartels that caused the so-called “senseless war” now “sensible war” to them are putting any stumbling block in every path of the R-ARCSS. The ignorant lots do not understand, that thisAgreement is different. It provides for justice and accountability, and whoever has committed atrocities during 2013 conflict up to-date shall be held accountable. Hence, it won’t be business as usual. Justice must prevail, for nobody is above the law. 

Last but not least – for the R-ARCSS to see light at the end of the tunnel – requires an inclusive and active participation of all stakeholders. Urgent inclusion of the holdout groups on the R-ARCSS’ peace-wagon will usher in popular legitimization of the Agreement, a golden opportunity and only hope for durable peace, justice, liberty and prosperity to reign in the country. However, the exclusion of holdout groups, ineffective participation of the grassroots, as well as the intransigency of the Parties to implement the Agreement “in letter and spirit”are a recipe for further instability and political abyss in South Sudan.

Manyang Rwei Gach – a Lecturer in law, Researcher & Human Rights Advocate – reachable at gatrwei2014@gmail.com

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